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Introduction and summary
By the middle of 2005, the U.S. civilian unemployment
rate had fallen to 5 percent, a level many analysts
consider consistent with essentially full employment.
However, individuals who have become discouraged
over their prospects of finding suitable employment
and, as a result, have given up looking are not counted
among the unemployed. Thus, analysts often look to
the labor force participation (LFP) rate, the fraction
of the population that is either employed or unemployed
as an additional indicator of labor market conditions.
In fact, the participation rate declined significantly
during and after the 2001 recession and remains well
below its 2000 level. This could imply more labor
market slack than the unemployment rate suggests.
The decline in LFP has been especially great
for teenagers. As figure 1 shows, teens’ participation
rates had been trending down since the late 1970s.
However, from 2000 to 2003, teen LFP fell a stun-
ning 7.5 percentage points, compared with a decline
in the overall rate of only 0.6 percentage points. Cur-
rently, the LFP for teenage boys is the lowest since at
least 1948 and for teenage girls is the lowest since
the early 1970s.
Figure 1 also shows that the decline since 2000
in the LFP rate for those 20 and older is considerably
less dramatic than the fall in the overall rate, which
includes those aged 16 to 19. Although those between
the ages of 16 and 19 represent only 4.2 percent of
employment (and 8.2 percent of population aged 16
to 69), they account for over half of the fall in aggre-
gate LFP since 2000. Strikingly, 16 year olds to 17
year olds, who account for only 1.6 percent of work-
ers and 4.3 percent of the population aged 16 to 69,
explain over one-third of the fall in aggregate partici-
pation since 2000. Thus, a better understanding of
the forces shaping the labor force participation of
teens may shed significant light on recent trends in
overall participation.
Another reason to look more closely at teen labor
force participation is to understand what this major
shift in the allocation of young people’s time may mean
for future productivity. The answer to this question like-
ly depends on what teens are doing instead of working
and whether those activities contribute to human cap-
ital development. On the one hand, if the reduction
in time spent working in the market has been accom-
panied by a concomitant increase in the time spent in
school or doing homework, one might reasonably ex-
pect an eventual increase in productivity consistent with
the well-documented returns to education.1 The impact
of the increase in schooling investments on the overall
economy might also include the positive externalities
associated with education, including spillover productivi-
ty effects on peers and other workers, lower crime, and
greater civil involvement in the public policy process.2
On the other hand, a shift in teens’ time allocation
from market work to leisure or other activities that do
not increase their human capital may negatively af-
fect their future productivity. In general, labor market
experience tends to raise subsequent earnings. More-
over, it is easy to imagine that moderate amounts of
time devoted to a part-time job during the summer
or while in school might inculcate good work habits
and allow young people to make more informed
educational and career choices.33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 1
Labor force participation, by age
percent
Note: The shaded areas are recessions as identified by the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Haver Analytics.












In this article, we examine the facts about teen
labor force participation in more detail. We show that,
although there is some variation in the magnitude,
the decline in teens’ labor force participation is ex-
tremely widespread. Virtually all groups of teens have
seen a decline in LFP. We then discuss a number of
possible explanations for this decline in teen labor
force participation over the past quarter century as well
as the sharper drop of the early 2000s. The possible
explanations that we consider can be grouped into
two categories: demand and supply. Those that would
tend to lower the wage associated with current work
can be thought of as reducing teen labor demand. Those
that increase the value of human capital investments
or tilt teens’ choices toward more leisure can be thought
of as reducing the per capita supply of teen labor.
In the end, it seems likely that the most important
factor behind the long-term decline in teen LFP over
the past 25 years is a supply-side development. The
significant increase in the rewards from formal edu-
cation (in the form of higher future earnings) began
to take hold shortly before teen participation peaked.
The fact that the average hourly wage rate of teens
relative to adult workers has changed relatively little
as teen labor supply has shifted in over the last quar-
ter century suggests either that the relative demand
for teen labor is relatively elastic or that it also has
been shifting in over time. The former possibility is
consistent with evidence we present on the impact
of increases in the number of competing workers on
teen participation. The latter possibility would be
consistent with the existence of skill-bi-
ased technical change, the tendency for
recent technological innovations to raise
the productivity of highly educated work-
ers relative to those who are less educat-
ed, including teens.4 Both possibilities
may be true.
It is less clear what caused the more
recent acceleration in the decline of teen
LFP. Wage trends suggest that a softening
in teen labor demand may have played
some role. Other evidence, however, sug-
gests that the recent drop is unlikely to
represent a significant margin of addi-
tional labor market slack.
Trends in teen labor force activity
We begin our analysis by reviewing
the history of LFP among 16 year olds to
19 year olds since 1948, the earliest year
for which we have data derived from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). The
CPS interviews a nationally representative sample,
which is currently approximately 60,000 households
per month. It collects information about the labor
market activities of all those at least 16 years of age.
The LFP rate shown in figure 1 is the share of civil-
ian noninstitutionalized 16 year olds to 19 year olds
who are either working or unemployed (available to
work and actively looking for work) in a given month.5
As the figure shows, there have been long periods
of expansions and contractions in teen participation
rates. Coming out of World War II, just over half of
teenagers were in the labor force. But, soon thereaf-
ter, LFP began to fall, reaching a low of just under
45 percent in the early 1960s. Over the next two de-
cades, teenagers slowly rejoined the labor market,
with their LFP rates peaking at 59 percent in the late
1970s. Since then, teen participation has pulled back
again, with LFP rates falling steadily, punctuated by
a particularly large decline starting around 2000.
Currently (as of December 2005), teen LFP stands
at 43.3 percent, over 15 percentage points below its
peak 25 years earlier, and at the lowest rate in our
50-plus-year sample.6
The broad swings in teen LFP may be partially
obscured by shorter-run fluctuations associated with
the business cycle. As one way to more clearly isolate
the longer-term movements from the business cycle,
figure 1 identifies periods, like the third quarter of 2005,
in which the aggregate unemployment rate was ap-
proximately equal to the Congressional Budget Office’s
(CBO) estimate of the non-accelerating inflation rate4 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
of unemployment (NAIRU) after having been above
it for some time. Changes in teen LFP between such
quarters should be little affected by changes in busi-
ness cycle conditions.
As the figure displays, the rate of decline in teen
LFP over the latest full business cycle was much
more rapid than over the previous two cycles. The
average drop of about 1 percentage point per year
between the first quarter of 1997 and the third quar-
ter of 2005 was about three times faster than the pace
of decline going back to the third quarter of 1987. If
the slower rate of decline in place between 1987 and
1997 had been maintained, the current teen LFP rate
would be about 5.5 percentage points higher than it
is currently.
Teen LFP patterns differ by gender. Historically,
male teens were more likely to work than females.
However, teenage female LFP grew dramatically during
the late 1960s and 1970s, likely reflecting the same
economic and cultural forces underlying the increase
in adult female LFP. As a result, by the early 1980s,
there was virtually no gender difference among 16
year olds to 17 year olds. For 18 year olds to 19 year
olds, the gender gap, while narrowing, did not disap-
pear entirely until the mid-1990s. This likely reflects
the especially significant increase in female college
attendance that took place over this period.
As one way to isolate the trend in teen LFP sepa-
rately from developments related to gender, figure 2
shows the labor market activity of teenagers relative
to the gender-specific LFP rates of prime
age adults (25 years to 54 years of age).
Specifically, we display the percentage
difference between the teen LFP rate and
the same gender’s adult rate.7 The rela-
tive LFP of female 18 year olds to 19
year olds has fallen the most steadily. In
the late 1940s, 18-year-old to 19-year-
old females were as much as 60 percent
more likely to work than adult women,
but now are about 25 percent less likely
to work than adult females. The steady
drop in the relative LFP of 18-year-old to
19-year-old females likely reflects their
equally impressive increases in college
attendance.8 For the other three age–gen-
der groups, the relative teen LFP rate fell
from the late 1940s until the mid-1960s,
when it began to rise. Between 1979 and
2000, these rates have fallen steadily, ac-
celerating again beginning around 2000.
For all four age–gender groups, the ratio
of teen LFP to the LFP of adults of the
same gender reached an all-time low during the cur-
rent cycle.
Generally, LFP is procyclical, rising during expan-
sions and falling during recessions. Figure 3 presents
teenage LFP rates since 1979 adjusted for normal
business cycle fluctuations in two alternative ways.9
The first version (the black dashed line), which we la-
bel the “time-series adjustment,” takes advantage of
the time-series relationships between LFP and aggre-
gate labor market conditions. In particular, we run the re-
gression 
23
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where Lt is the LFP rate of group i at time t, Ut is
the overall unemployment rate at time t,  t U  is the
CBO’s estimate of NAIRU, t is a time trend (1979 = 1,
1980 = 2, and so on), and εt is a white noise term.10
We define the cyclically adjusted LFP at time t as
1 ˆ () . tt tt L LU U =− β −   This assumes the business cycle
effect is proportional to the gap between the actual
unemployment rate and CBO’s NAIRU.11
The second version (the green dashed line),
which we label the “cross-sectional adjustment,”
 also subtracts a constant multiple of the unemploy-
ment gap, but uses differences in state experiences
to estimate the parameter relating LFP to unemploy-
ment. Specifically, we regress state-level teen LFP
on state-level aggregate unemployment. To control
for long-term differences in LFP across states, we
also add state fixed effects. Thus, the identification
of  ˆ β  is based on within-state changes in teen LFP
and unemployment.12 As figure 3 shows, there are
FIGURE 2
Labor force participation of teens relative
to 25–54 year olds of the same gender
LFP of teen group less LFP of gender-specific 25–54 population
Note: The shaded areas are recessions as identified by the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Haver Analytics.
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three periods since 1979 when the cyclical adjustment
is important, although the degree depends somewhat
on which technique is used. In the early 1980s and
early 1990s, the economy slowed, unemployment
rates rose, and the teen labor market activity declined.
Had the unemployment rate remained at the natural
rate, the teenager labor market activity would have
risen by roughly 1 percentage point to 3.5 percentage
points in the early 1980s and 1 percentage point to
2 percentage points in the early 1990s. Given the
former adjustment, it might be the case that the un-
derlying trend in teen labor market activity peaked
in the early 1980s rather than the late 1970s. Likewise,
the booming economy of the late 1990s pushed up
teenage labor force participation by roughly 0.5 per-
centage points to 1.2 percentage points, thus exagger-
ating the decline since then.
FIGURE 3
Cyclically adjusted teenage labor force
participation rates
percent
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current Population Survey.














Table 1 shows that the unadjusted
series falls by 8.4 percentage points be-
tween 2000 and 2005. In rows 2 and 3,
we report how much of this decline is
due to previous secular trends and the cy-
cle, as computed using our two tech-
niques. We compute trend as the slope of
the line between 1987:Q3 and 1997:Q1,
two quarters when the unemployment
rate and the CBO’s natural rate were
roughly the same. Between those two
periods, teen LFP fell 0.3 percentage
points per year. This trend suggests that
teen LFP would have fallen by about
1.8 percentage points between 2000 and
2005. The cycle adds another 1 percent-
age point to the decline. So just over
5.5 percentage points of the 8.4 percent-
age point fall over this period remains
unexplained.
These cyclically adjusted figures are
derived from micro (that is, individual-
level) data from the CPS.13 This has the
advantage of allowing us to explore heterogeneity in
labor market activity across the teenage population.
For example, we can ask whether the labor market
activity of teens from high-income families looks
different than that of teens from low-income families.
For the rest of this section, all figures and tables use
cyclically adjusted (with the time-series adjustment)
rates in order to get a cleaner picture of secular trends.
Table 2 shows the change in teenage LFP from
1979 to 2005, as well as between 1987 and 1997 and
since 1997, by gender, race, and region. We also com-
pute changes by family income and school enrollment
but begin these calculations in 1984, when the vari-
ables become consistently available.14 Note that each
group’s series is cyclically adjusted separately, resulting
in some groups, such as enrolled students, having much
of the LFP decline explained by the business cycle.
The most striking aspect of table 2 is how wide-
spread the decline is. Although it is clearly not uniform,
the rate for every subgroup reported in the table has
fallen since the early 1980s, typically 2 percentage
points to 20 percentage points for 16 year olds to
17 year olds and 1 percentage point to 17 percentage
points for 18 year olds to 19 year olds. For nearly all
groups, the majority of the cyclically adjusted decline
in LFP has occurred just in the past five years; LFP
has fallen 5 percentage points to 9 percentage points
among younger teen groups and 2 percentage points
to 7 percentage points among older teens. While there
is substantial variation by age and school enrollment
TABLE 1





Long-term trend –1.8 –1.8
Cycle –1.1 –0.8
Unexplained –5.5 –5.8
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current
Population Survey.6 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
status, the patterns are fairly
similar within race and family
income groups.
Of course, many of these
measures are correlated. To iso-
late which of these groups expe-
rienced economically and
statistically significant drops,
conditional on other characteris-
tics, we ran multivariate regres-
sions of a teen’s decision to be
in the labor force (a dichotomous
0–1 variable for whether they
are in the labor force) on their
background characteristics, two
linear time trends—one that be-
gins in 1984 and the other in
1997—and each of their charac-
teristics interacted with the time
trends.15 Level shifts across back-
ground characteristics are picked
up by the covariates themselves
(for example, the female indica-
tor measures the average gender
gap for a person of the same race,
age, family income, and region).
The interaction terms measure
differences in average growth
rates across groups, after condi-
tioning on other characteristics
of the teen and her family. The
results are reported in table 3
separately by age (16 year olds
to 17 year olds versus 18 year
olds to 19 year olds). For exposi-
tion purposes, we only report the
coefficients of the time trends
and their interactions with the
background characteristics. How-
ever, all regressions include level
shifters for income, race, gender,
and region. The regression model
is parameterized so that the time
trend coefficients show the aver-
age time trend over all individuals
in the sample and the interaction
term coefficients show how the
time trend for a given group dif-
fers from the average trend.
On average, between 1984
and 1997, LFP fell by 0.22 per-
centage points and 0.28 percent-
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.7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
year olds to 17 year olds and 18 year olds to 19 year
olds, respectively. Since 1997, the decline has signif-
icantly accelerated: to almost 1 percentage point per
year among 16 year olds to 17 year olds and 0.7 per-
centage points per year among 18 year olds to 19 year
olds. The decline varies somewhat across groups, es-
pecially post-1997. Since then, teen LFP has fallen
fastest among 16-years-old to 17-years-old boys and
16 year olds to 19 year olds in the middle part of the
family income distribution (between the 25th and
75th percentiles). Racial gaps are negligible once
income is controlled.16
All calculations discussed thus far have been limit-
ed to the “extensive” margin of teens’ labor supply—
whether they are in or out of the labor force. Similar
developments have occurred on the “intensive” mar-
gin—the time spent working conditional on participa-
tion. For example, among those that work at all, the
average workweek length has declined almost 3.5 hours,
or 12 percent, since 1979. This is somewhat offset by
an increase in the number of weeks worked per year.17
Combining the two figures gives us an estimate of
annual hours worked, conditional on working at all.
Between 1979 and 2004, teens that work reduced their
market work activity by 70 hours per year or 9 per-
cent, and as with LFP, much of this decline has tran-
spired recently. Thus, a substantial decline in teen
work activity has occurred at both the extensive and
intensive margins over the past two and a half decades.
TABLE 3
Teenage labor force participation time trends
Time trend 1 = 1984 to 1997
Time trend 2 = 1997 to 2005
16–17 year olds 18–19 year olds
Time trend 1 Time trend 2 Time trend 1 Time trend 2
Intercept
Time –0.22** (0.045) –0.97** (0.059) –0.28** (0.052) –0.73** (0.069)
Male –0.02 (0.042) –0.16** (0.053) –0.05 (0.046) –0.04 (0.06)
Female 0.02 (0.045) 0.17** (0.058) 0.06 (0.054) 0.05 (0.07)
1st quartile income 0.03 (0.057) 0.17* (0.170) –0.23** (0.069) 0.34** (0.09)
2nd quartile income –0.06 (0.108) –0.32* (–0.320) 0.41** (0.124) –0.61** (0.162)
3rd quartile income 0.08 (0.085) –0.20 (0.108) 0.14 (0.097) –0.27* (–0.27)
4th quartile income –0.13 (0.084) –0.05 (0.107) 0.29** (0.093) –0.17 (0.121)
White –0.05 (0.012) –0.03* (–0.030) –0.01 (0.013) –0.03 (0.015)
Black 0.13 (0.121) –0.03 (0.159) –0.08 (0.143) –0.28 (0.192)
Hispanic 0.19 (0.148) 0.01 (0.159) 0.23 (0.175) 0.00 (0.193)
Other race –0.02 (0.205) 0.55* (0.550) –0.05 (0.243) 0.51 (0.284)
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current Population Survey.
Has demand for teen labor been weak
recently?
As we noted earlier, a drop in LFP could, under
some circumstances, be a sign of some additional
labor market slack. At least in the case of teenagers,
we think that such an interpretation of current devel-
opments is hard to square with several facts.
First, the CPS asks whether those out of the
labor force want a job, and in recent years there has
not been a notable increase in the number of such
teens. As can be seen in figure 4, the fraction of the
teen population that is out of the labor force but
wants a job increased in the wake of the 1980–82
and 1990 recessions. But the most recent downturn
saw much less of an increase. The long-term trend,
moreover, is toward a lower fraction of teens being
classified as wanting a job, but not employed.
A second difficulty with the weak demand expla-
nation is apparent in the relative employment growth
of the industries most likely to hire teens. If the sharp
absolute and relative decline in their participation was
primarily due to weak demand, we would expect to
see that the industries that have traditionally hired
teenagers had fallen on hard times, disproportionately
impacting teenage work activity. However, we know
of no evidence that traditional employers of young
people have performed poorly recently. If anything,
the top five industry employers of teenagers (in order:8 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
eating and drinking places, grocery
stores, miscellaneous entertainment and
services, construction, and department
stores), accounting for almost half of all
16 year olds to 19 year olds employed
in 1999, have together experienced em-
ployment growth well above the national
average. Since 2000, payroll employment
in these five industries combined rose
3.6 percent, while employment in the
remaining industries fell by 2.0 percent.
Trends in teens’ wage rates provide
another piece of evidence on the reasons
for the decline in their LFP. If the decline
in teen LFP was primarily due to weak
demand, one would expect their relative
wages to have fallen. Over the ten-year
period prior to 2002, that was clearly not
the case, as can be seen in figures 5 and
6. Figure 5 plots teenager real wages
(in 2000 dollars), as computed in the
CPS and deflated by the Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index, along with
the real value of the federal minimum wage (green
line) and the real value of the minimum wage after
accounting for state laws (dashed line). Actual real
wages of teens were flat during the latter half of the
1980s and early 1990s but grew by 21 percent, or
roughly 2 percent per year, between 1993 and 2002,
which more than kept pace with the wages of less-ed-
ucated adults. The latter point can be seen in figure 6,
which plots the ratio of teen wages to adult wages and
teen wages to less-educated (high school diploma or
less) adult wages. In the 20 years prior to 2002, the
average hourly wage rate of teens rose roughly 5 per-
centage points relative to prime-age workers without
any college education, although it fell 2 percentage
points relative to all prime-age workers.
However, since 2002, the real wage rates of teen
workers, though still well above their levels in the
late 1980s and 1990s, have fallen modestly. This is
undoubtedly partly the consequence of a declining
real minimum wage.18 Although a number of states
have increased their minimum wages recently, the
average real minimum wage remains roughly 8 per-
cent below 1998 levels. Declining real wages could
also be consistent with some softening in the demand
for teen labor in the last few years. However, given
the lack of an increase in the rates at which teens re-
port they want a job, it is unlikely to be the major
factor in the decline in teen LFP.19
Crowding out by adult low-skilled workers
One possible demand-side explanation for lower
teen work activity is that teens are facing stiffer com-
petition for jobs from other workers. Card (1990)
provided a classic analysis of a similar question—
the effect of increased numbers of immigrants on
native workers’ labor market outcomes—by studying
the case of the large and likely exogenous increase in
the number of workers in the Miami labor market af-
ter the Mariel boatlift of 1980, when a mass exodus
of Cuban refugees landed on Florida’s (particularly
Miami’s) shore. He finds that this influx of roughly
7,000 low-skilled Cubans had a positive impact on
the employment of native Miamians, particularly rel-
ative to the employment of similar workers in four
comparable cities. Lewis (2004) shows that the boatlift
caused industries in Miami to adapt to less skill-in-
tensive technologies, allowing the economy to pain-
lessly absorb new workers.
When we extend Card’s analysis to teenagers,
comparing how the teenage labor force participation
rate in Miami looked pre- and post-Mariel and relative
to Card’s four comparable cities (Atlanta, Houston,
Los Angeles, and Tampa–St. Petersburg),20 our re-
sults are quite similar to his. Table 4 shows that teen-
age labor force participation rates rose absolutely
(by 4.1 percent) and relative to the comparison cities
(by 8.2 percent) in the year after Mariel. Likewise,
teenage unemployment rates fell by over 6 percent in
Miami and almost 8 percent in the comparison cities.
Furthermore, when we extend the analysis past 1981,
FIGURE 4
Share of teenagers not in the labor force who want a job
percent
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current Population Survey.










18–19 year olds9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
it is apparent that the 1981 (non)effect remains stur-
dy years after the boatlift, suggesting that there is no
evidence of a delayed reaction to the influx of workers.
The boatlift is a valuable experiment because the
influx of workers into Miami likely had little to do
with the area’s pre-boatlift labor market conditions
but more to do with its geographic proximity to Cuba
and the decisions of the Cuban government. But, of
course, it is possible that Miami’s experience in the
wake of Mariel is not representative of other cases in
which the number of low-skilled workers
increased. Therefore, we explore two al-
ternative analyses.
The first is the sizable influx of low-
education single mothers with children
after the 1996 Welfare Reform Act. Since
1995, the LFP of such women rose 30
percent, while it increased only 5 percent
for low-education single women with no
children and fell for the population at
large. We concentrate on single mothers
with two or more children and a high
school diploma or less, given Meyer and
Sullivan’s (2004) evidence that the law
primarily impacted such women.21 We
break the data into individual states and
regress state teenage LFP on year and
state fixed effects, the share of low-edu-
cation single moms with two or more
children, and that group interacted with
an indicator of whether the year is 1996
or later. This interaction tells us whether
the influx of such women post-reform
had an impact on teenage work activity.
In fact, we find no evidence that increas-
es in low-education single women with
children crowd teens out of the work
force. Consistent with the Mariel evidence,
an F-test fails to reject the hypothesis
that the post-1996 year dummies inter-
acted with share of such women in the
state differ from zero.22
Our second analysis is not tied to
specific exogenous events. We created
a state panel from 1979 to 2004 of teen-
age labor force participation rates, along
with the share of the state population that
1) has less formal education (high school
diploma or less) or 2) has less formal ed-
ucation and is unemployed or out of the
labor force. We then regressed teen LFP
on each of these, including state and year
fixed effects in order to identify the asso-
ciation between within-state changes in teen work
activity and within-state changes in the share of poten-
tially substitutable workers. We also allowed each
state to have its own time trend. Here, we do find re-
sults consistent with crowding out. However, the size
of the effect is often economically small and statisti-
cally insignificant. More importantly, the size of the
unskilled adult work force has been shrinking over
time. In 1979, about 49 percent of the 25-year-old to
FIGURE 5
Teenage real hourly wages and the real minimum wage
real wage, in 2000 dollars, deflated by PCE
Note: PCE is personal consumption expenditures.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current Population Survey.












The ratio of teenage to adult wages
teenage to adult wage ratio
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current Population Survey.










to less-educated adults10 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
65-year-old population had a high school diploma or
less. In 2004, only 35 percent did. Thus, in the aggre-
gate, this cannot explain the large secular decline in
teen participation over this period.
Crowding out by peers
The LFP of teens could also be affected by the
sheer size of their peer group. Like the crowding out
story described previously, increases in the size of
teen cohorts could cause their wages and LFP  to
decline. However, the share of the working-age pop-
ulation accounted for by teens fell substantially from
roughly 12.5 percent in the 1970s to 8.5 percent in
the mid-1990s and has been relatively flat since then.
Thus, if anything, the trend in teen cohort sizes should
have pushed their wages and LFP up through the
mid-1990s and been neutral since then.
Supply explanations
We suspect that teen LFP declines, particularly
over the long run, are driven primarily by labor sup-
ply choices. This section describes three possibilities:
the increased time devoted to school, the increased
time spent helping out at home as mothers return to
the labor force, and increases in wealth.
Increased time devoted to school
A massive literature has documented
that the financial return to obtaining
more education has increased significant-
ly in recent decades.23 This can be seen
in figure 7, which is based on a standard
methodology to value the effects of in-
creasing educational levels on hourly
wage rates.24 As the figure shows, the re-
turn to having a college education began
to rise substantially in the late 1970s,
shortly before teen LFP began to decline.
Figure 8 shows the substantial rise in
the fraction of 16 year olds to 19 year olds
enrolled in school, particularly in the
1980s. For each age group, it displays
two measures of the fraction of the popu-
lation enrolled in school. The lines labeled
“October” are estimates of the enrollment
rate for the month of October that are de-
rived from a special supplement to the
CPS that has been done every October
since the late 1960s. The lines labeled
“all months” are estimates of the average
enrollment rate over the entire year. They
are derived from a question on enrollment
status that was added to the basic CPS in
1985. The all months lines are substantially lower
than the October lines because they include the summer
months of June through August when most students
have traditionally been on vacation from school. Both
the October lines and the all months lines show in-
creases in enrollment over time, but the slope of the
all months lines have been steeper recently. This is
because enrollment increases have been especially
great in the summer months. For example, summer
enrollments were only 20.5 percent in 1992, when
the increases began, but 44.3 percent in 2005.
Table 5 reports a simple decomposition of the
change in teen LFP into components due to 1) the
increase in enrollments given constant within-enroll-
ment-status-group LFP rates, and 2) the fall in LFP
within-enrollment-status group given a constant en-
rollment rate. The calculations are based on the more
comprehensive all months measure of enrollment
mentioned earlier.
Panel A of table 5 shows the decomposition for
the drop in LFP between 1987 and 1997. As we noted
above, aggregate labor market conditions were simi-
lar in the two years, so the changes reported should
be largely free of business cycle effects. As the table
shows, the enrollment rate increased by 0.65 percent-
age points per year over this period.
TABLE 4
The effect of immigration on teen LFP
and unemployment rates: The case of the
Mariel boatlift of 1980
Year
Group 1979 1981 1981 – 1979
A. Teenage LFP
Miami 39.6 43.7 4.1
(4.2) (4.6) (6.2)
Card (1990) comparison cities 56.8 52.7 –4.1
(1.3) (1.3) (1.8)
Miami-comparison difference –17.2 –9.0 8.2
(4.4) (4.7) (6.5)
B. Teenage unemployment rates
Miami 27.3 21.2 –6.2
(5.5) (5.6) (7.8)
Card (1990) comparison cities 17.7 19.5 1.8
(1.4) (1.5) (2.0)
Miami-comparison difference 9.6 1.7 –7.9
(5.6) (5.6) (8.1)
Notes: The comparison cities are Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and Tampa/
St. Petersburg. Standard errors are in parentheses.




Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the March and October
Current Population Surveys.
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The contribution of this enrollment change to the over-
all decline in teen LFP was 0.18 percentage points
per year. This is the change in overall teen LFP that
would have occurred if LFP had remained constant
for both enrollees and non-enrollees. The increase in
enrollments at constant within-enrollment-status-group
LFP accounts for 60 percent of the decline in teen
LFP over the period.
The table also shows the contributions of within-
enrollment-status-group LFP to the overall decline.
Among teens who were enrolled in
school, LFP declined by 0.12 percentage
points per year. This was a little over one
third of the 0.31 points per year rate at
which LFP declined overall. Given that
68 percent of teens were enrolled in
school, the contribution of their LFP de-
cline to the overall LFP decline was 0.08
percentage points per year, or 26 percent
of the total. The rate of LFP decline for
non-enrollees was slightly faster at 0.14
points per year. But because they are a
smaller fraction of the teen population
than enrollees, the non-enrollees’ decline
in LFP only accounted for 14 percent of
the total drop in LFP.
Panel B of table 5 shows the same
decomposition for the change in teen
LFP between 1997 and 2005. Again, these
were two years in which, by standard
measures, aggregate labor market condi-
tions were similar. As we discussed
earlier, the rate of decline in teen LFP
increased over this period to about 1 per-
centage point per year. Table 5 shows
that most of this acceleration was due to
faster declines in LFP within-enrollment-
status groups. The rate at which enroll-
ments rose did increase somewhat
relative to the earlier period, resulting in
about a 10 percent increase in the annual
contribution of enrollment increase to
teen LFP decline. But, the biggest factor
in the acceleration was the significant in-
crease in the rate at which LFP declined
for those enrolled in school. The contri-
bution of that factor to the decline in teen
LFP increased by over 0.5 percentage
points per year and its share of the entire
decline increased to 62 percent. A faster
rate of decline in LFP for those not en-
rolled also contributed to the faster rate
of overall teen LFP decline.
The calculations just described only capture the
effects of increased schooling at the extensive mar-
gin.25 However, similar effects may be at work on the
intensive margin—conditional on being in school,
students may be devoting more time to their studies
and less to part-time or full-time jobs. However, the
evidence on this point is quite a bit sketchier. A U.S.
Department of Education (2005) publication reports
time spent in school increased 30 hours to 40 hours
per year (or about one hour per week) between 198712 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 5
Decomposition of teen LFP decline into enrollment change and within-enrollment-status effects
Contribution to Percent of total
1987 1997 Annual changea LFP decline LFP decline
A. 1987–97
Percentage enrolled 61.07 67.60 0.652 –0.184b 60.0
LFP of enrolled 43.71 42.55 –0.116 –0.079c 25.6
LFP of not enrolled 71.69 70.56 –0.136 –0.044d 14.3
Overall LFP 54.69 51.62 –0.307 –0.307 100.0
Contribution to Percent of total
1997 2005 Annual changea LFP decline LFP decline
B. 1997–2005
Percentage enrolled 67.60 73.16 0.696 –0.195b 19.6
LFP of enrolled 42.55 35.80 –0.843 –0.617c 62.2
LFP of not enrolled 70.56 65.17 –0.674 –0.181d 18.2
Overall LFP 51.62 43.68 –0.993 –0.993 100.0
aPercentage points per year.
bAnnual change multiplied by initial period difference in LFP between enrolled and not enrolled.
cAnnual change multiplied by end period percentage enrolled.
dAnnual change multiplied by end period percentage not enrolled.
Note: Final column may not total due to rounding.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current Population Survey.
and 1999. Another U.S. Department of Education
(2001) report found that for ages 13 to 17, the amount
of homework time increased between 1984 and 1999.
Juster, Ono, and Stafford (2004) find large increases
in schooling and studying time between 1981 and 2002,
although as we discuss later, there are reasons to think
that the time-use data on which that study is based
may be subject to substantial measurement error.
It is possible, albeit a bit speculative, that the in-
creasing recognition of the value of more education
in recent years has played a role in the sharp recent
decline in teen LFP. For example, after falling fairly
steadily by 3.3 percentage points between the 1983–84
and 1999–2000 school years, the high school gradua-
tion rate, defined as the number of diplomas issued
as a fraction of the population of 17 year olds, rose
5.1 percentage points to 74.9 percent in the 2003–04
school year. Perhaps recognition that schooling is in-
creasingly valuable is causing teens who are enrolled
in school to study harder and graduate more frequently.
As a side effect, it may be lowering their rate of labor
force participation.
Substituting house work for market work
Among the biggest developments in labor markets
over the past several decades has been the increased
participation of women, particularly those with chil-
dren. There is substantial evidence that technological
innovations, such as the washing machine, dishwasher,
and the like have aided in this transition. Furthermore,
there has likely been an important reallocation of
home production from wives to husbands.26 But how
has the increase in female labor force participation
affected teenage children? Specifically, has it led
teenagers to substitute house work for market work?
As part of a pilot study on 322 children aged six
to 17 in the early 1980s, the Institute for Social Re-
search (ISR) at the University of Michigan conducted
a time-use survey, where parents filled out time diaries
in five minute increments. Juster, Ono, and Stafford
(2004) compared this survey to a similar one conducted
in 2001–02 using families from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). For 15 year olds to 17 year
olds, they show that market work fell by over one
hour per week over the two decades, while home
production work increased by two hours per week.27
However, there are some serious problems with this
survey, particularly in the earlier years. The authors
warn that the definition of home and market work may
have been altered between surveys. Furthermore, many
hours in the early 1980s survey are simply unclassi-
fied. But if we assume that these unaccounted hours
are not work hours, and even if we combine the two
work activities, we can infer that teen home produc-
tion must have increased given the sizable fall in
teenager market work hours documented in the CPS.
Nevertheless, because these results are based on
small samples with highly imperfect data, we turn to13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
more recent time-use data from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics to uncover within-household home–
market work distinctions.28 Because this survey only
began in 2003, we must rely on cross-sectional evi-
dence, in this case, differences in the number of earn-
ers in the family. We compare the work activity of
teenagers with two parents working to the work activity
of teenagers with one parent working and one parent
at home. Our informal test asks whether teenagers
with a mother working out of the home spend more
of their day doing housework and, consequently, less
of their day in market activity. In fact, we find no ev-
idence of this trade-off. Among teenagers living in a
home with both parents working, 11.3 percent of
their typical nonsummer day is spent working away
from home and 8.9 percent working within the home.
Among teenagers living in a two-parent home with
only their father working, market activity is lower
(9.8 percent) and home production work is higher
(9.7 percent), a result inconsistent with mothers shifting
more home production work to their older children.
Moreover, we find that number of siblings has little
impact on market activity and, if anything, leads to
more home production work, not less.
Finally, we find similar patterns when looking
directly at labor force participation by number of
parental earners in the family. If both parents work,
teenagers are more likely to work as well. This is
true even if we stratify the sample into family income
quartiles and look at teen work activity within income
quartiles or, in a regression context, if we control for
family income (and number of siblings). Consequent-
ly, we cannot conclude from these data that the rise
in adult female labor force participation has led to
the decrease in teenager labor force participation.
Wealth effects
A final explanation of the decline in teen work
activity that we explore is the role of increases in
wealth among families with teenage children. Basic
economic theory predicts that when wealth increases,
and the wage available to a worker in the market-
place, as well as preferences for leisure, remain the
same, people will want to work less and consume
more leisure. In practice, pure wealth effects are hard
to uncover because they require situations where these
assumptions (especially a constant market wage) hold.
Nevertheless, researchers have exploited a number of
clever examples where increased sources of wealth
are likely exogenous to the person supplying the la-
bor, including bequests, war reparations, and lottery
winnings.
At first glance, we find little support for such a
possibility. In particular, parental income and teen
LFP are, if anything, positively related in 2004 (as
well as all other years). However, this could be be-
cause parental income is correlated with many other
factors that might influence teen work. Moreover, in-
flation-adjusted median net worth has barely budged
for families with heads aged 35 to 54, the families
where the vast majority of teens reside. However, for
such families real mean net worth increased 1.5 per-
cent to 2 percent per year between 1983 and 2001
(the latest year of publicly available data) and aggre-
gate real median and mean net worth increased 2.2
percent and 3.7 percent, respectively, per year over
the same period. The vast majority of the aggregate
increase is due to older households.
Here, we provide several pieces of evidence to
quantify the role wealth may play in explaining the
recent acceleration in the decline in teenage LFP.
All three revolve around college pricing. A fall in the
price of college can have two implications for work
activity. First, cutting prices causes demand for that
product to rise. Since time is constrained, an increase
in enrollment pushes people out of work and other
activities. Second, as the cost of college falls, students,
particularly those at the margin of the enrollment de-
cision, need to work less to afford it. Keane and Wolpin
(2001) offer an example of this result within a dynamic
model of the school–work decision for young men.
Among the exercises they present is a simulation of a
$3,000 per semester tuition subsidy. Their results sug-
gest that the average full-time student earns over $450
less (and consumes over $1,200 more) per school year
than a baseline group that does not receive this subsi-
dy. Using the outgoing rotation files of the CPS to
compute hourly wages allows us to infer that some-
one in their sample (white male full-time student)
will work 89 fewer hours per school year after such
a subsidy. In other words, a transfer of wealth to stu-
dents and their families can significantly reduce
work time.
We attempted two simple exercises to test the
predictions of their simulations. First, we compared
the work participation rates of teenagers in states that
have introduced state-wide merit scholarships, often
called Hope Scholarships, with rates for states that
have not. The Hope Scholarship program, initiated in
Georgia in 1993 and adopted in some form by 15
other states since, offers students a free or highly re-
duced tuition to in-state universities so long as they
meet minimum entrance requirements, minimum
college performance criterion, and attend an in-state14 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
college.29 In Georgia, for example, qualified in-state
students receive up to $4,500 ($3,000 for private
school) per academic year for tuition, fees, and book
expenses, regardless of family income.
Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2005) find that
the program is working as intended—in-state college
enrollment has increased. But their research describes
several other important results as well. First, Cornwell,
Lee, and Mustard (2005) document a number of “grade-
enhancing” strategies—including enrolling in fewer
classes and withdrawing from those where performance
is subpar—used by students to ensure qualification
for the scholarship. Second, roughly two-thirds of the
increase in in-state enrollment is due to students switch-
ing from out-of-state colleges to in-state colleges,
particularly four-year institutions. Finally, in line with
the Keane and Wolpin (2001) results on consump-
tion, Cornwell and Mustard (2005) show a positive
association between county-level car purchases and
Hope Scholarship grantees. Together, these results
are consistent with the notion that these programs are
transferring wealth to college-attending children and
their families with relatively little direct impact on
skill accumulation and current market wage rates.
Consequently, the Hope program can be thought
of as a useful experiment to analyze labor supply
wealth effects—what happens if we increase wealth
leaving all else unchanged, including a worker’s po-
tential market wage. As shown in table 6, among 16
year olds to 17 year olds in Hope states, LFP fell by
10.4 percentage points between 2000 and 2004. By
comparison, in states without a Hope program, the
decline was 8.7 percentage points. That is, young
teen LFP fell 1.7 percentage points more in Hope
states after 2000. Since 24 percent of all teens in the
country reside in states with merit scholarship pro-
grams like Hope, we can estimate the impact these
scholarships had on aggregate teen LFP. We find that
roughly 5 percent (0.24 times 1.7 divided by 8.8) of
the decline in young (16 to 17) teen LFP could be
traced to differences in Hope and non-Hope states.
The actual impact is likely bigger once we account
for timing and generosity differences across states,
which we plan to do in follow-up research.
Columns 2 and 3 of table 6 repeat this exercise
for 18 year olds to 19 year olds by school enroll-
ment. We find a small negative impact among those
in school (about 2 percent of the total decline among
18 year olds to 19 year olds between 2000 and 2004)
but no effect, at least on the extensive margin, among
those not currently enrolled.30
While these effects are relatively small, they also
represent just one of many financial aid programs of-
fered in the U.S. (see Wirtz, 2005). A natural way to
corroborate and generalize these findings is to see
how changes in tuition, more broadly defined, influ-
ence work decisions. Typically, such studies examine
the impact of tuition on college enrollment deci-
sions.31 Instead, we analyze the teenager labor force
participation rates of tuition using real annual tuition
and fees data from the College Board (2005). The
data are available back to 1975 for four-year private,
four-year public, and two-year public institutions.32
In general, the tuition results seem consistent
with those for Hope Scholarships. Overall, we find
that tuition changes are positively correlated with
teen work activity. From a statistical perspective,
the strongest results are those for two-year college
tuition rates. This is what we would expect since
these are the rates that likely affect students whose
enrollment decision are most price sensitive. Further-
more, we find that families from the upper middle of
the income distribution are more likely to respond to
college price changes. This strikes us as plausibly the
part of the income distribution for which enrollment
decisions are particularly sensitive to tuition.33 Final-
ly, while tuition at four year colleges has risen in re-
cent years, the cost of attending community college
is now substantially lower that during the second half
of the 1990s. For instance, the College Board reports
that community college tuition, net of grants and ed-
ucation tax benefits, fell from $1,000 for the 1997–98
school year to $200 for 2001–02. Our results suggest
this decline could have lowered LFP for some teens.34
Overall, we view the evidence as consistent with
the hypothesis that increased wealth, via lower educa-
tion prices, can reduce teen labor supply. The impor-
tance of this effect for recent trends depends critically
on the real net price of schooling over time, which
we believe has fallen at the margin. While the Keane
TABLE 6
Percentage point change in teen LFP,
by Hope Scholarship status, 2000–04
18–19 18–19
16–17 in school not in school
Hope states
(24% of total pop.) –10.4 –5.9 –3.6
Other states –8.7 –5.4 –3.6
Difference –1.7 –0.5 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current
Population Survey.15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
and Wolpin (2001) results are based on a larger tu-
ition reduction program than recent experience, the
flavor of their structural model matches our empiri-
cal findings.
Conclusion
Teens can be thought of as allocating their time
between current market work, current leisure, and
human capital investment. Since the late 1970s and
especially since 2000, they have devoted less of their
time to current market work. To a significant extent,
they have also been increasing the time they devote
to human capital investment. The increased value of
education for their future earnings has apparently
caused teens to increase their school enrollments and
likely also the intensity with which they pursue their
studies when enrolled. We know less about any pos-
sible changes in their leisure time. However, we have
found some preliminary evidence that wealth effects
from increased financial aid may have reduced their
work effort as well.
It is possible that a sudden drop in demand for
teen labor has played a role in the recent, sharp de-
cline in teen participation rates. The modest decline
in relative teen wages would be consistent with some
role for weakened labor demand. We doubt, however,
that this is the main explanation. The latest recession
ended more than four years ago. In an unusual devel-
opment, teens who are out of the labor force are not
likely to report that they want a job, and the indus-
tries that typically employ them have been reporting
stronger than usual overall employment growth. Of
course, only time will tell whether the recent drop in
teen participation is a manifestation of a weak labor
market or a new equilibrium. The increases that we
have noted in teen’s human capital investments,
however, do suggest some reason for optimism for
future levels of productivity.
1See, for example, Aaronson and Sullivan (2001) for a discussion
of the impact of greater educational attainment on aggregate
productivity.
2See Moretti (2004) for a review of this evidence.
3See Ruhm (1997) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003)
for interesting discussions of these issues.
4For example, see Katz and Autor (1999). See Card and DiNardo
(2002) for a skeptical view of the skill-biased hypothesis.
5This definition ignores several interesting groups. First, the data
does not include those who are under 16. Second, by concentrating
on the noninstitutionalized population, we are ignoring the sizable
increase in incarceration over the last three decades. The adult prison
population has grown from 0.2 percent of the adult population in
the early to mid 1970s to almost 1 percent by the late 1990s. See
Katz and Krueger (1999). Their study assumes that 35 percent of
the incarcerated would be employed if not in jail. A similar assump-
tion for incarcerated teenagers would lead to an even stronger
trend down in the teenager LFP over time. Finally, the civilian
population ignores the military. This might be of particular con-
cern during the 1960s.
6Recent declines in teenager work participation have occurred
throughout much, but not all, of the developed world, according
to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
7For example, a “–20” reveals that that teenage group’s LFP is
20 percent lower than the same gender’s adult population.
NOTES
8For example, in the early to mid-1970s, female school enrollment
was 3 percentage points to 6 percentage points lower than males
among 18 year olds to 19 year olds (calculated from the October
files of the CPS). By the early 1990s, this gap disappears. Several
years later, school enrollment among the same aged females was
1 percentage points to 4 percentage points higher than their male peers.
9We focus on the period since 1979 because the CPS outgoing ro-
tation files begin in that year. As a third alternative, we have also
used the Hodrick–Prescott Trend, a standard statistical tool to iso-
late a long-term trend from short-term fluctuations in time-series.
Those results provide a similar story to the two cyclically adjusted
series presented in figure 3.
10We have also estimated this equation with a lag in Ut to allow for
delays in responding to aggregate conditions. This has no appre-
ciable difference on the results. This equation seems adequate for
picking up the time trend since 1979 but would not work as well
over a longer period since there appears to be trend breaks in this
series in late 1970s and early 1980s and perhaps in the early 1960s
as well. In that case, we would simply estimate the time trends
separately for different periods. We chose to focus our analysis
on the post-1979 period.
11However, Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) show how impre-
cisely estimated the natural rate is.
12These regressions also use time dummies rather than linear time
trends. Time dummies are unidentified in the time-series version.
13We use the outgoing rotation files of the CPS. Participating
households are surveyed for four months, left out of the sample
for eight months, and finally surveyed again for four additional
months. Those households in the fourth and eighth months of
their participation are known as the outgoing rotation groups.16 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
14Our technique for matching teenagers with their parents exploits
the family relationship variable in the outgoing rotation files. This
variable begins in 1984. We subtract the teenager’s own income
from the family income measure.
15We specified the time trends so that there is a kink, rather than
a discontinuous jump, at 1997.
16We have also run these regressions with controls for school en-
rollment status and its interaction with the time trends. Adding
these additional regressors does not impact the gender, race, income,
or (unreported) regional time trends in a significant way. The im-
pact of enrollment on LFP is discussed later.
17The weeks worked calculation is based on the March CPS. We
are able to compute family income back to 1979 because the March
files contain an explicit measure of family income (that is, there
is no reason to have to match teenagers with other family members).
Again, we use family income less the teenager’s own income.
18Over the period shown, between 66 percent and 80 percent of
teenagers (and 80 percent to 90 percent of 16 year olds to 17 year
olds) had wage rates within 50 percent of the minimum wage.
19Of course, one possibility is that teens report not wanting a job
because they know wages are not above their reservation price
(that is, the lowest wage at which they are willing to work). This
story has particular resonance if we believe that teens look at the
minimum wage, which has declined steadily since last raised at
the federal level in 1997, rather than actual market wages when
deciding whether to work.
20Card (1990) selected these cities because of their similarity to
Miami in terms of racial composition and economic growth dur-
ing the late 1970s and early 1980s.
21For example, the LFP rate of single mothers with two or more
children has grown by 30 percent since 1996, while the rate for
single women with no children has been relatively flat.
22These results, as well as others referenced in the text without
tables and figures, are available upon request from the authors.
23See, for example, Katz and Autor (1999).
24The estimates are based on a regression of the natural logarithm
of wage rates on standard variables such as potential experience,
gender, and race and indicator variables for different levels of
schooling. The data are from the March CPS. See Aaronson and
Sullivan (2001).
25An alternative way that time in school may have increased is
through changes in legally mandated years in school. Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001) find that the number of years required in school
has not changed much since the middle of the 1900s. See also
Lochner and Moretti (2004).
26See Blau (1998) and Greenwood and Vandenbroucke (2005).
27In this article, the term “home production work” includes all
work performed within a household for which no compensation
is received from outside parties.
28The data are available at www.bls.gov/tus/home.htm. We use
both the 2003 and 2004 surveys. Hammermesh, Frazis, and
Stewart (2005) provide background.
29In some states (like Georgia), there are two components to the
Hope program—a merit scholarship that requires minimum grades
and is applied to degree programs and a grant that can be applied
to two-year and less than two-year programs but has no grade re-
quirements.
30However, Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2005) and Cornwell,
Lee, and Mustard (2005) find that a sizable fraction of the college
enrollment effect happens among freshmen who delayed college en-
rollment by more than 12 months past their high school graduation.
31See Mazumder (2003) for a nice review.
32To allow for information delays, we include two years of lags
on tuition. LFP is computed from September to August to corre-
spond with school year tuition data.
33When we estimate teen LFP regressions separately by family in-
come quartile, data limitations only allow the series to start in 1985.
We find that the only income quartile where there is a statistically
significant response to price changes is the second highest (in-
come between the median and 75th percentile), although all quartiles
have a positive, albeit imprecisely estimated, point estimate.
Despite the small sample sizes, we found that none of these
results are sensitive to outliers. We also tried using a separate dataset
on two-year college tuition rates provided by the Washington State
Education Group. The advantage of their data is that it is disag-
gregated by state. When we aggregate their data to the national
level, we find correlations that are very similar to the College Board
data. However, our attempts to use panel methods to take advan-
tage of state differences in tuition and teen LFP growth are unre-
liable. We suspect measurement error is severe at the state level,
which attenuates estimates of the betas. Mazumder (2003) finds
little correlation between this tuition measure and enrollment, which
is generally contrary to the literature. Obviously, there are many
refinements that could be made to each of these analyses that would
limit the damage from measurement error, including looking at
teenagers who are at the margin of deciding whether to go to col-
lege and improving our understanding of what the relevant tuition
measure is. The latter, for example, would entail better informa-
tion on financial aid.
34See College Board (2005). Since 2002, two-year college costs
have begun to rise and aid has stagnated, but net costs remain his-
torically low.17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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